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Tennessee Valley Authority 田纳西河谷管理局

Another very ambitious agency involved with electric power was the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA). Although it was also very successful and became a national showcase for the New Deal, it aroused even more opposition than REA. A largely self-financing agency insulated from continuous congressional pressure, TVA aspired to be the sole producer of electricity in portions of seven States in the Mid-South. According to its critics, this was as close to “socialism,” if by socialism is meant state control of major industries, that the United States had ever come.

另一个与电力有关的非常有雄心的机构是田纳西河谷管理局(TVA)。尽管它也非常成功并成为新政的国家样板, 但它比农村电气化管理局(REA)引起了更多的反对。作为主要自筹经费的机构国会持续的压力对田纳西河谷管理局没有影响。 田纳西河谷管理局志在成为中南部七个州部分地区单独的电力生产者。如果按照社会主义意味着国家控制主要的产业,对于它的批评认为这接近于“社会主义”,那在美国也曾经有过。

During World War I, the federal government had constructed a hydroelectric dam and nitrate explosive factory that used the power of the Tennessee River as it made a rapid descent at Muscle Shoals in northern Alabama. After the war, the Republican administration of President Warren Harding attempted to privatize the facilities, proposing that they be turned over to automobile magnate, Henry Ford. Nebraska’s Democratic Senator George Norris, the self-styled “Prairie Populist,” would have none of that, declaring that a transfer to Ford would be “the greatest gift ever bestowed upon mortal man since salvation made free the human race.”47 Norris was an enthusiastic proponent of public power and wanted Muscle Shoals to be used for that purpose alone. His first Muscle Shoals bill was pocket-vetoed by President Warren Harding in 1928. Two years later President Herbert Hoover vetoed it outright.

在第一次世界大战期间联邦政府曾建立一个水电坝和硝酸盐炸药工厂,它们使用田纳西河的能量因为田纳西河在北阿拉 巴马州的马斯尔肖尔斯有急剧的落差。战后共和党总统沃伦哈丁试图使这些设施私有化,计划将它们移交给汽车巨头亨利福特。 自称为“牧场平民论者”的内布拉斯加州民主党参议员乔治诺里斯拒绝了这一企图,他声称转移给福特将会是“人类被拯救以来 最大的礼物”。诺里斯热心支持公共能源,希望马斯尔肖尔斯被单独用于这一目的。他的马斯尔肖尔斯法案1928年被总统沃伦哈丁 搁置了。两年以后被胡佛总统直接否决了。


At the turn of the century, U.S. Forest Service founder Gifford Pinchot and President Theodore Roosevelt had suggested that natural resources could be managed in a coordinated way by following the natural geographical boundaries created by river basins. When Franklin Roosevelt was elected, this concept was resurrected.48 On May 18, 1933 the President signed into law the Tennessee Valley Authority Act, one of the first New Deal acts and the only one enacted during the first 100 days of his administration that did not specifically address the economic depression. It adopted Senator Norris’ original idea and greatly expanded upon it by proposing to take “the Tennessee River as a whole and developing it systematically, as one great enterprise, to bring about the maximum of navigation, of flood control, and of the development of electricity.”49 The area to be served, the poorest and least developed in the country, encompassed the 650-mile long Tennessee River, eighth-longest in the United States, and a basin approximately equal in size to that of Scotland and England. At the time it was home to about two million mostly rural and small town people, who had always opposed governmental intervention in their lives. The Great Depression, however, had softened their resistance and they were now more than willing to give TVA a chance. Mindful of the region’s history, its directors were always very solicitous of local sensitivities and made every attempt to accommodate them by involving interest groups, universities, and political institutions in all decisions and projects. The ownership and distribution of electrical power was seen by some as socialistic, but in all other respects, TVA was a relatively conservative organization, which rarely antagonized elite opinionmakers in the region.


Within months of TVA’s enactment, thousands of engineers and workers were constructing dams and new towns to house the workforce throughout the length of the river.


Farm land was purchased, and in some cases condemned, to make room for reservoirs. This occasionally created hardships, especially for several hundred small farmers in eastern Tennessee, but TVA did its best to relocate them or assist in their transition to other occupations. TVA’s dams and reservoirs had an unintended consequence, which ultimately became one of its greatest contributions to regional development. By raising and lowering water levels, TVA made the Tennessee River inhospitable to the malarial mosquito, previously a serious health problem and a barrier to migration into the valley.


In the process of building dams, TVA created libraries, functioning local governments, and other institutions in rural areas that had never known them. These towns with all their amenities were eventually turned over to the States. By the early 1940s, TVA had created much goodwill in the region.50 Citizens of the valley referred to it affectionately as “our TVA.” Until the 1960s, its only strong opposition came from politicians in Washington, DC.


The early history of TVA centered around its battle with private utility companies and an internal struggle for power among its directors. The first was largely settled in 1938 when the courts ruled that TVA could sell electricity within its region. Within a year, private companies, knowing they could not compete, sold out to the Authority.


President Roosevelt appointed Arthur E. (A.E.) Morgan, an engineer who had built dams in Ohio, as chairman of TVA. David Lilienthal, a crusading public-interest lawyer working for the Wisconsin Utilities Commission, and Harcourt Morgan (no relation to Arthur), an agronomist and president of the University of Tennessee, were named as directors. The three men operated as co-equals, each taking responsibility for a major function. A.E. Morgan built the dams, Lilienthal managed power production, and Harcourt Morgan was in charge of TVA’s agricultural program.51


Despite this arrangement, friction soon developed, with Lilienthal and Harcourt Morgan aligned against A.E. Morgan over the issues of electric power distribution and agricultural extension work. A.E. Morgan favored a gradualist approach to the private power companies, proposing to use demonstration projects to show private companies and the public how cheap and efficient electric power production could be. Lilienthal, politically more astute and experienced, knew that the battle could not be settled short of outright victory. He wanted to distribute electricity in as wide an area as possible and vigorously prosecute TVA’s legal right to do so.


A.E. Morgan’s disagreement with Harcourt Morgan was more subdued but fundamental enough to alienate the two men. A.E. Morgan had a vague dream of developing the region into an Arcadia of small prosperous farms and small industry. His ideas were seemingly more attuned to those of the nostalgically conservative “Southern Agrarians,” but he never spelled out how they would be realized. Harcourt Morgan had worked with the Extension Service combating the boll weevil in Alabama and wanted to gradually replace the region’s numerous small “peasant” farms cultivating soil and nitrogen depleting row crops such as cotton and tobacco with larger soil conserving ones growing grasses, feed crops, and livestock. Unlike A.E. Morgan, he did not want to develop an autonomous TVA agricultural program, preferring instead to work with the Extension Service and regional universities, whose political and technical support he considered essential for TVA’s survival.52


In 1938, these disagreements came to head when President Roosevelt summoned the three men to Washington. When A.E. Morgan refused to answer some questions regarding his dispute with Lilienthal, FDR fired him for “contumacy.” Harcourt Morgan replaced him as chairman but Lilienthal was the real power behind the throne. Three years later he officially became the chairman. By then the electric power program was in full swing and the Authority had begun to attract industry to the region. Following America’s entry into World War II, it became a favored location for war production. The biggest and most important facility was the uranium plant at Oak Ridge, TN.53


Harcourt Morgan’s agricultural program rested on three pillars: (1) the fertilizer factory at Muscle Shoals, which had been converted from nitrogen to phosphorous production to serve the needs of farmers growing cover crops; (2) the universities’ agricultural research on phosphorous fertilizer; and (3) the USDA Extension Service, which brought the first two to the attention of farmers. During the early days of the New Deal, the Extension Service was concerned that some new agencies would encroach on its turf. Had it been shut out, it could have caused the Authority considerable political grief. Instead it threw its resources energetically into Harcourt Morgan’s phosphorous program, while at the same time successfully working to keep new agencies such as the Soil Conservation Service and the Resettlement Administration out of the region. (TVA, however, did sell electricity to cooperatives financed by the Rural Electric Administration, but REA did not compete with the Extension Service.)


Demonstration farms, which had always been a favorite technique of the Extension Service, helped spread the word about phosphorous, cover crops, pasturage, and contour farming, and participating farmers were supplied phosphorous and advice in exchange for following Extension Service recommendations. By 1938, there were 6,500 demonstration farms in the seven states covering 1.1 million acres.54 The farmers tended to be relatively prosperous because the poorer ones could not afford to take land out of production for fertilizer application.


Farm tenants, many of whom were black, were poorly represented. Black county extension agents and the black colleges were excluded. In all of its programs and hiring, TVA, a favorite of northern liberals, followed the “southern custom” of the time and discriminated against African Americans. That said, TVA can still claim to have played an important part in transforming the agriculture of the Mid-South from one based on small, poor, cotton- and tobacco-producing farms to one that was much more prosperous and diversified.55


Speaking about one of TVA’s benefits to a church meeting in the 1940s, a Tennessee farmer said: “Brothers and sisters, I want to tell you this. The greatest thing on earth is to have the love of God in your heart, and the next greatest thing is to have electricity in your home.”56


Soil Conservation and Drought Relief

The New Deal also instituted several programs that promoted development by protecting natural resources and enhancing the quality of rural life. Some of these, such as drought relief, were episodic, while others, such as erosion control, operated on a permanent basis.


On January 6, 1936 the Supreme Court invalidated the Agricultural Adjustment Act. On that same day, Secretary Wallace decided to invite farm leaders to Washington, DC to discuss ways of getting around the court decision. In the meantime, USDA officials had begun to devise a plan to pay farmers for voluntarily shifting acreage from soil-depleting surplus crops into soilconserving legumes and grasses. This program was consistent with an earlier recommendation by the Program Planning Division of the AAA that soil conservation become a major objective of the adjustment program.


After studies and meetings with farmers, plans were made for a gradual change from a relatively inflexible acreage control program based on acreage of specific crops to one adjusted to land use needs and good farm management. The plan, however, did not call for a complete abandonment of production adjustment. On February 29, 1936 Congress adopted this approach when it passed the Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act, the purpose of which was to "promote the conservation and profitable use of agricultural land resources by temporary Federal aid to farmers. . ."57 Under the new act (actually an amendment to 1935 legislation on soil erosion control) farmers were to be paid for shifting acreage from soil-depleting to soilconserving crops. According to the authors of the official USDA history Century of Service, the programs of 1936 and 1937 were: "…considered a success by the Department and by farm organization leaders. The soil conservation program of 1936 cushioned the effect of the severe drought of 1936 by encouraging increased supplies of grasses and legumes. It not only provided feed for livestock, but decreased the severity and extent of dust storms. The payments contributed greatly needed income to farm families in the drought area, serving as a kind of disaster insurance."58


Although helpful, these measures did not eliminate the need for special emergency drought-relief programs in the 25 States and 1,194 counties which had been designated as drought areas by the end of 1936. On July 22, 1936 the President appointed an interdepartmental Great Plains Drought Committee, with the Secretary of Agriculture as chairman, to coordinate and accelerate the Government’s drought-relief activities. This committee was succeeded on September 17 by the Great Plains Committee. Measures undertaken included granting reduced freight rates; making livestock, feed, and transportation loans; and instituting cattle and sheep purchase programs. In addition, the soil conservation program was modified to encourage an increased production of needed food and feed crops in the drought area.59


Another important element in the effort to conserve rural farmland was the 1935 transfer of the fledgling Soil Conservation Service (SCS) to USDA from the Department of the Interior, where it had begun 2 years earlier as the Soil Erosion Service. Interior Secretary Ickes had not supported the service because he questioned the propriety of giving direct Government assistance to private landowners. However, Hugh Bennett, the founder of the service, and many members of Congress did not share this concern.60 Therefore, Ickes eventually agreed to permit the transfer to USDA.


During its brief 2-year period within Interior, the service had established 40 erosioncontrol projects, 37 of which were demonstrational in character and involved private lands.


Three projects were located on Federal land and covered a total of 35 million acres. The demonstration projects on private land encompassed 4 million acres in 31 different States. Much of the manpower for this work was supplied by the 50 Civilian Conservation Corps camps that had been assigned to the service. After its transfer to USDA, the service began to promote the establishment of soil conservation districts throughout the country. Organized as voluntary farmer cooperatives, the districts were authorized to engage in cooperative action "to combat soil erosion and to prevent local misuse of land by prescribing land use regulations."61 Like the AAA and REA, the SCS enjoyed widespread support throughout the United States. According to the authors of the USDA history, this was so because the: "Soil Conservation Service's call to action to save the soil as a national heritage was the most easily understood and widely accepted objective of the agricultural programs inaugurated during the 1930s. Since it stopped with man's relationship to the land and did not become involved with the disturbing problems of prices, landownership, and rural poverty, it could be universally accepted without controversy as a patriotic objective. While ‘bankrupt land’ contributed to the problems of ‘bankrupt people,’ soil conservation alone could not solve their problems."62


Another outcome of the effort to lessen the effects of the Great Plains drought and erosion was crop insurance, which also developed out of another presidential committee established in 1936. The USDA Federal Crop Insurance Corporation, with an authorized capital stock of $1 million, was created by Title V of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938. Because the crop insurance and agricultural adjustment programs were closely related, the AAA with its already established field organization was given the responsibility for field administration of the crop insurance program.


Crop insurance was also tied into the agricultural conservation program by a provision permitting conservation payments to be used for the payment of insurance premiums. The ease of payment was one important factor for the increased participation by 1940. The number of agreements more than doubled over 1939, and the insured acreage increased by about 80 percent.63


Farm Credit

By 1933, many farmers’ savings had completely vanished due to the near collapse of the banking system. Banks were unable to sell their bonds, other sources of farm credit had dried up, and lenders were foreclosing mortgages threatening hundreds of thousands of farmers with the loss of their farms. The passage of general banking reforms in 1933 and 1935 creating the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, tightening bank inspection, and increasing Federal Reserve authority helped improve the general financial climate, but agricultural credit institutions needed some immediate targeted assistance.


Beginning in 1918, the Secretary of Agriculture was authorized to make emergency seed, crop, and feed loans. Five years later, Congress authorized the organization of 12 Federal intermediate credit banks to work alongside the Federal land banks. These banks, by discounting farmers’ short-term notes, were to provide funds for operating expenses. Congress hoped commercial banks would use their services and that farmers would also organize local associations to act as retailers of credit. Federal intermediate credit banks had only limited use up to 1933 because of lack of retail outlets. Congress had authorized the Secretary of Agriculture to lend farmers the money to organize local agricultural credit corporations to use the facilities of the Federal intermediate credit banks, but only a few had been organized.


On March 27, 1933 President Roosevelt signed an executive order centralizing all of the activities engaged in administering loans to farmers and in supervising farm credit agencies making such loans in the newly-created and independent Farm Credit Administration (transferred to USDA in 1939).


On May 12, 1933 Congress passed the Emergency Farm Mortgage Act providing a $200 million fund to the Land Bank Commissioner to make both first and second mortgage loans to refinance farmers’ debts. It also provided for a temporary reduction in interest on Federal land bank loans. The Farm Credit Act was enacted on June 16, 1933, providing for the creation of local production credit associations to bring the services of Federal intermediate credit banks to farmers.


From May 1933 until the end of 1935, the land bank system, on its own behalf and for the Federal Farm Mortgage Corporation, held 48 percent of the total farm mortgage debt. The refinancing program cut farmers’ interest bills by about $38 million a year. In addition, many creditors agreed to scale down farmers’ debts to improve their chances for mortgage loans and thus enable creditors to get cash.


All of these actions helped stem the tide of foreclosures, save the farms of hundreds of thousands of families, and liberate the assets of country banks and insurance companies.64

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