True D. Morse and the Beginnings of Post-War Rural Development Work Dennis Roth
True D. Morse’s Early Work
Between World War II and 1955, the Federal Government was relatively uninvolved in rural development. The postwar economic recovery obscured to some extent the problems that still existed in rural America. Many Americans, when they thought of rural areas at all, assumed that they too were enjoying the fruits of prosperity and, thus, there was little political pressure for a renewal of New Deal-style programs. Only a few policymakers, such as USDA Secretary Charles Brannan (1948-1953), attempted to move against this current. This period, however, did see the beginning of private sector efforts to improve rural conditions. 在二战与1955年之间，联邦政府对农业发展的介入相对较少。战后的经济复苏在一定程度上掩盖了美国农村仍然存在的问题。对许多美国人来说，当他们想到农村地区的时候，他们都认为这些地区也一定在共同享受着繁荣带来的好处，所以很少有重建新体系的政治压力。只有少数的政策制定者，比如美国农业部秘书Charles Brannan (1948-1953),尝试着逆流而行。 然而，这段时期确实见证了不少个人为改善农村状况而做出的努力。
The Doane Agricultural Service, a private firm in St. Louis, MO headed by True D. Morse, future USDA Undersecretary and leader of the rural development program from 1954 to 1960, provided planning assistance to individual farms. It drew detailed maps, analyzed soils and productivity, investigated local markets and community structures, and then produced a farm management plan - "a long-term program, an architectural design, to guide the future development and operations of the property to achieve maximum results." Doane农业服务中心(在St. Louis的一个私人公司),在True D.Morse的带领下(未来的美国农业部副部长和从1954到1960开始的农村发展计划的领导者),提供了对个体农民的资助.它规划了详细的地图,分析了当地的土壤和生产力,调查了当地的市场和社区结构,然后提出了一个农场管理计划--一个长期的计划,一个建筑般严谨的设计,将会指导未来农业发展,并且运转现有的资金使之达到最大效益 In the late 1930s it began to assist "large lending organizations" in setting up their future farm loan programs. Part of the work involved the making of State studies, with detailed statistics and maps. A measuring process was developed to reflect the influence of various factors. Doane's final product was a state map of farm loan territories, which outlined "policies to be followed in making farm or ranch loans adapted to the specific area and its debt-carrying capacity." 1930后几年，它开始资助“大型租借机构”来设立他们未来的农场贷款计划。部分工作涉及到州的情况研究，涉及到详细的数据和地图。为了反映各种因素的影响，一个测量工作开始了。Doane最终的成果就是一张农村贷款版图，它描绘出了适应贷款的政策的几个特殊地区和它们的负债能力。 As a result of this kind of work, Morse gained much experience in both local and regional planning. On July 27, 1944 he presented a talk entitled "Rural Community Development" to the Southwestern Institute for Commercial Executives in Dallas, TX. During this speech Morse discussed many of the issues that would become staples of the rural development program of the 1950s, and was perhaps the first person to publicly utter the expression “rural community development.” 因此，Morse从当地和地区计划得到了的宝贵经验。1944，7月27日，他向在Dallas, TX西南商业执行协会发表了一个名为“农村发展”的讲话。在这个讲话里，Morse讨论的很多问题都成了未来的1950年代的农村发展计划的主要组成。Morse可能是第一个在公共发言中提出农村发展计划的说法的人 Morse began by warning his listeners of the drastic changes that would affect agriculture when the war was over. In particular, he predicted that southern agriculture would lose thousands of jobs to mechanical cotton pickers (fig. 5). Agriculture was facing a major shakeout that would result in the demise of many rural communities. However, those communities that consciously planned for the future would have a much better chance of surviving. According to Morse, "Nothing could be more fascinating and productive of greater benefit than building a program for a permanently progressive community and then, through the years, molding it to fit the pattern." Morse开始提醒人们战后可能发生的巨大变化将会对农业产生巨大影响，他特别预言，在南方，将会有成千上万个工作机会因为机械采棉的推广而消失。农业将面临大规模的轻度经济衰退，这种情况将导致很多农村合作组织的消亡。然而，这些组织如果可以有意识地开始为未来计划的话，他们将会在未来得到更好的生存机会。Morse说：“没有什么能比建立一个永久的进步的组织并使它在随后的发展中逐渐成型，适应发展范式更加吸引人，更加能产生巨大效益。 Figure 5--Farm Productivity, 1910-1970 Source: Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dept of Commerce, Historical Statistics of the United States, 1975.
The first step in planning was to make a complete survey of all the physical, biological, social, economic and other factors affecting an area because an "intelligent and objective study is necessary if an effective program is to be built." Next came the drafting of the community plan and basic program: "Management cannot function effectively without a program which clearly sets out the goals and the way in which they are to be reached." The third step was the long-term administration of the program so that it conformed to the basic plan: "Any community that would make the most effective growth and development must be constantly guided toward the ultimate objective." 计划中的第一步是彻底地调查各个影响一个地区发展的因素：自然，生物，社会，经济等。因为一个高效的计划要投入运行，理性客观的研究是必需的。接下来的工作是起草合作社的计划和基础计划。“如果没有一个清晰的目标和要达到的具体步骤，就没有高效的管理。”第三步是一个符合基本计划的长期的经营，“任何组织只有在最终目标的持续指导下才能不断高效成长。” Morse saw the community survey as consisting of: (1) boundaries of the community or trade area; (2) natural physical factors; (3) climatic factors; (4) government and governmental agencies; (5) public developments such as roads, schools, churches, hospitals, parks and drainage; (6) private developments, including both town and farm properties and companies; (7) economic functions and the way in which business operates in the local markets; (8) people, including ethnic composition and educational levels; (9) finances, including both public and private resources and indebtedness; (10) other factors discovered during the survey. Fifteen years later many rural communities were conducting surveys modeled after the elements in this proposal of 1944. Morse认为调查报告要包括：各个地区的合作组织的明确范围和贸易范围，自然因素，天气因素，政府和政府组织，公众设施（包括道路，学校，教堂，医院，公园，排水设施），私人设施（包括镇和农场中，私人财产和公司情况），经济运行的功能和方式，人（包括种族构成和受教育水平），经济（个人和公众财产和负债情况）和其他的变量。15年以后很多农村合作组织都以这个在1944年提出的模型为指导进行调查。 Morse then counseled his listeners that such a time-consuming survey should be undertaken only if the community was strongly committed to putting it to use in a development program: "Those placed in charge must be capable of weighing all facts revealed by the study and setting up a specific program to guide continuing developments." Morse忠告他的听众，这样一个费时的调查只有在合作组织保证将忠实地将它运用于发展计划，才可以被施行“这些投入必须能够衡量研究中透露的各种事实，必须能够建立一个特别的计划来指导农业持续发展。 The plan was to be made up of steps that would seek to optimize farm productivity and rationalize the distribution of credit. Morse wanted to diversify farm operations so that they would be less vulnerable to market fluctuations. He observed that off-farm labor had become increasingly important to farmers and speculated that diversified farms could absorb much of this labor. He reasoned that: "When farm processing becomes general, many will not have to leave their farms for extra work. If they do not have their own farm factory they may find employment in that of a neighbor's."1 这个计划包括农产品生产最优化，合理分配贷款资金的步骤。Morse希望农场生产可以多样化，这样就可以减小市场波动带来的冲击。他注意到闲置劳动力对于农场主来说越来越重要，他认为多样化的农场生产将吸附大量劳动力。 The idea that farmers should become involved in the processing of their own crops, beyond churning butter for home use and grinding feed, etc., was a visionary suggestion that was never implemented, perhaps because Morse and others never foresaw how it was to be accomplished. According to Thomas Hady, a USDA Economic Research Service (ERS) rural development economist from 1965 to 1993, such plans did not exist in 1965, when it was common to talk about home-based industry but not processing farm products. “If expanded secondary processing of farm-grown commodities was his program at that time, I think it is a fascinating step in the development of rural development thinking.”2 有种不切实际的想法认为，农民不仅要打理庄稼，而且还要干些搅拌奶油和磨面粉等诸如此类的活儿，这种提议从来没有被采用过，也许是因为Morse和其他人从来没有预见到这怎样才能实现。 根据一位曾于1965到1993供职于美国农业部经济研究服务部门的农村发展经济学家Thomas Hady提供的说法，在1965年并不存在这种计划，那时候人们经常谈论基于家庭的 产业而不是加工农产品。“如果那时就有开展次级农产品加工的计划，我想这无疑是农村发展思路一次了不起的飞跃。 Morse also foresaw the need to increase the amount of nonagricultural industry in rural communities, but spoke of this more as an afterthought than as a centerpiece of his proposal. Implicit in the Dallas speech was his belief that agriculture was still the overwhelmingly dominant rural industry, but the brief mention of the role of nonagricultural industry anticipated the expanded approach to rural development that was implemented in the 1950s. Morse还预见了增加农业区内非农产业的需求，不过这东西对他来说不是赫赫彪炳，反而像事后诸葛亮。 毫无疑问，在达拉斯讲演中他表明农业仍然是压倒性农村产业，简单提到非农产业在农村的扩张预期——这一预期在1950年代被付诸实践了。
Finally, Morse reminded his listeners that the objective of economic development was to enhance the health, recreational, religious, domestic, and governmental aspects of rural life: "Increasing the earnings of the people in an area is only a means to an end, not an end in itself."3Morse's speech circulated widely, and in 1947 business leaders in Tupelo, MS, led by Tupelo Daily Journal publisher George A. McLean, called on him to draft a plan for their area. 最后，Morse提醒听众，经济发展的目标是令农村卫生、娱乐、宗教、家庭及政府各方面有所改观。“一个地区人民的收入增长只意味着某种手段的结束，不是结束收入增长本身。”Morse的讲演传扬开来，1947年，马萨诸塞州Tupelo的商业领军人物由Tupelo日报发行人George A. XXX牵头拜访了Morse，请他为Tupelo拟定发展规划。 According to Morse, "Tupelo businessmen raised $30,000 a year out of their own pockets to assist farmers in overhauling their rickety farms."4 Morse told them that the development of any trade area "ought to be pretty much as you approach the effective planning and development of a farm. After all these rural towns are pretty much the economic center of a big farm." They spent the next year formulating the plan and then moved "aggressively" to implement it. The contents of this plan are not known but apparently it was very successful because Morse reported that soon after its implementation Tupelo's business activity was increasing twice as fast as the State average and that "delegations from hard-pressed counties in 23 States visited Tupelo, and some returned home to put similar programs into operation as quickly as possible."5 Morse说，“Tupelo商人从他们口袋里每年掏出3万美元，帮农民修房子。”贸易领域的任何发展“都仿佛你有效地规划和发展了一个农场。毕竟所有的乡镇都差不多是一个大农场的经济中心。”他们次年开始规划，并“雄心勃勃地”付诸实践。规划内容不得而知，不过看起来相当成功，因为Morse报告称Tupelo的商业活动增长速度是全国平均值的2倍，“备感压力的代表团从23个州涌向Tupelo取经，一回去就马上照葫芦画瓢，上类似的项目。”
In 1949 business leaders in Asheville, NC raised $250,000 and began a so-called "Partnership for Progress" program encompassing 16 surrounding counties. Again, they called on Morse to draft a plan for their area, and within a year it began to experience the same kind of economic growth as Tupelo. The success of these programs convinced Morse that local initiative and self-help were the most powerful engines of rural development. In the meantime a few people in the Federal Government were trying to revive interest in the rural poverty problem, which had been temporarily obscured by wartime demand for farm products and labor shortages. 1949年北卡罗来纳州Asheville的商业大腕儿们筹集了25万美金，推行一个“进步好伴当”项目，涵盖旁边16个县。他们又一次请Morse去规划，1年内这儿始始经历Tupelo式的经济增长。这些项目的成功使Morse确信，当地积极性和互帮互助实乃农村发展的终极杀招。（译者注：听起来有点像我们53年搞互助组的意思^_^) 与此同时，联邦政府有些人试图重新唤起对农村贫困问题的关注，
Secretary Brannan Anticipates the Great Society
布安南部长的伟大社会
In the presidential campaign of 1948 Secretary of Agriculture Charles Brannan had been instrumental in "delivering" much of the Midwestern farm vote to President Truman.
Encouraged by his high standing within the administration, Brannan hoped to persuade Congress to support his efforts to alleviate rural poverty.
1948年的总统选举中，农业部部长布安南背负使命，要给杜鲁门总统拉来中西部农业区的选票。 此人官居高位，意欲说服国会，支持他农村扶贫的种种努力。
In 1949 Brannan appeared before the Low-Income Subcommittee of the Joint Committee on the Economic Report chaired by Senator John Sparkman of Alabama. He pointed out that, depending on the criteria used, about one-half of all farm families could be classified as lowincome.
1949年，布安南在阿拉巴马州参议员约翰·斯帕克曼即将成为经济委员会的低收入分会主席之前现身了，他指出，按目前标准，半数的农村家庭都被划成低收入家庭。
According to Brannan, "much more assistance must be rendered to low-income farm families to complement the programs that are geared more directly to the needs of their more fortunate brothers." He then analyzed the contributions of individual USDA agencies.
The Farmers Home Administration (FmHA) had been created to assist low-income families, but the limited scale of its operations made it unable to deliver operating and farm ownership loans to more than a fraction of the eligible farm families who had requested them.
Also, the "very effective special teaching methods" by which FmHA provided low-income families with farm and home management assistance had never been adequately implemented.
The education services of the Extension Service were theoretically available to all farmers but, according to Brannan, the "difficulties and problems of carrying on educational work with low-income farm families are much greater" than with wealthier farmers. The result was that low-income families received less educational information.
Poor farmers got less assistance from the Farm Credit Administration because they had "no basis for this type of credit. For them the benefits, at best, are indirect, deriving from the existence in their communities of cooperative credit institutions or of cooperative associations financed by them." They were less likely to benefit from soil conservation districts because they lacked the capital or credit to finance needed conservation measures.
Finally, price support programs benefited low-income farmers, "but usually only to the extent that they have products to sell. Of course, price supports do not meet the fundamental problem of the operator who cannot produce a large enough volume to make a good return at any price."
Brannan asserted that the solution to the problem should be sought within the context of an expanding national economy so that broader opportunities could be provided both within and outside of agriculture. Brannan was emphatic that rural poverty should be attacked in a comprehensive way because we "cannot compartmentalize our thinking or our programs in this field. We will make a grave mistake if we do not agree upon a consistent overall policy and provide for cohesive administration of the programs designed to carry out such a policy." He then outlined three broad programs:
1. A special readjustment or redevelopment program for small farmers who are likely to continue to find their best opportunity in farming. To accomplish this he asked Congress to expand FmHA's authority so that it could loan more money at lower and more flexible rates. This proposal was based on "our experience over the years [which] shows that low-income farm families can make phenomenal progress if a little opportunity and assistance is made available to them."
2. Stimulation of further industrial development in underdeveloped rural areas and special assistance to low-income farm families or persons living on inadequate farms who desire to engage in nonfarm work either full or part time. The technological revolution in agriculture made this imperative. According to Brannan: "Full-time or part-time jobs in nonfarm work may be the best answer to the twofold problem of raising the level of living of some low-income farm families and contributing to economic stability." Here he agreed with people in the private sector such as True D. Morse, but with the difference that he wanted a special government agency created for this purpose, one that "might not necessarily be lodged in the Department of Agriculture." He foresaw the creation of job training programs "with financial assistance to cooperating industries in the training program; financing transportation and moving costs to new job opportunities with special attention to nearby areas; subsistence grants to new employees during the training period . . . and expansion of recruitment and placement facilities in areas of heavy agricultural underemployment."
3. A program for the benefit of families or persons who gain their living principally as hired farm workers. Here he sought legislation that would extend wage and hour standards, social security, unemployment insurance, and workmen's compensation to farm workers and create standards for housing. In addition, he advocated that special job placement aids, transportation assistance, relaxation of State residence requirements for health and welfare services, and more education facilities for children be provided to farm workers and their families. Brannan told the panel that these activities would "require a division of labor to be worked out between the Department of Agriculture, the Department of Labor, the Federal Security Agency, and other Federal and State agencies."
In addition to the need to promote social justice, Brannan justified these programs on the basis that rural underconsumption was slowing national economic growth and that a disproportionately large number of future citizens would come from the ranks of the rural poor.
He predicted that "if these children reach maturity embittered by the experiences of their early lives and ill-equipped for the economic struggle, the effect on the American future will not be good." One of his congressional interlocutors observed that the poor might then migrate to the cities where they could fall victim to communist propaganda. Brannan's proposal might then be seen "as our greatest bulwark right there to help these people before they go in and live in these teeming slums."
In both its overall thrust and its specific details, Brannan’s proposals anticipated those put forward by the Kennedy and Johnson administrations 11 to 15 years later. His warning that rural poverty could corrupt national life by forcing millions of unprepared poor people into cities foreshadowed the debate over rural/urban population and development imbalance begun by Secretary Orville Freeman in 1965.7 But 1949 was not the right time to ask for major changes in rural policy, as was soon shown by the demise of USDA's Bureau of Agricultural Economics (BAE).
In the 1930s, BAE became one of the principal staff groups supporting New Deal agriculture and agricultural resettlement policies. After the war it turned its attention to cotton production in the South. A BAE study concluded that most of the laborers, tenants, and small farmers employed in cotton production would soon have to find other work. BAE economists proposed incentives and training programs for this purpose and also wrote a report entitled "Cultural Reconnaissance" that contained references to race relations, white supremacy, and racial segregation. Important southern congressmen were very critical of this kind of rural development research, and a departmental reorganization in 1953 abolished BAE and scattered its economists among other agencies. Another way would have to be found to promote rural development, one that avoided even the hint of direct federal intervention in local communities.8
In 1950, rural sociologist Douglas Ensminger pointed to some characteristics of rural areas that future rural developers would attempt to take advantage of. Writing in Rural Life in the United States, Ensminger asserted that the "record to date shows that agencies have succeeded or failed depending upon the degree to which they have entered the culture of the people - that is, the degree to which they have become a part of the community." He went on to say that in the preceding years rural society had become increasingly differentiated, and that in many areas formal organizations with ties to federal agencies had replaced informal associations.
The ability to affect the development of these communities, Ensminger argued, would be based on understanding the significant group relationships and the basic trends in organization and in continuing to interpret them in meaningful terms, "so that those who seek to guide and give leadership to rural life in programs may do so with knowledge and wisdom." The implication of this article was that Federal agencies would have to work through local associations and governments if they were to succeed. In other words, rural sociologists were reaching conclusions similar to those of True D. Morse.9
